Changing geopolitics in Oceania
Introduction: Changing geopolitics in Oceania
Authors
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius
Wesley-Smith, Terence
A seismic shift is underway in global politics as the primacy of the United States (US)—and the Western world in general—faces its most significant challenge since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than three decades ago. Propelled by rapid economic growth, command of cuttingedge technologies, and expanding military power, the People’s Republic of China (China) has emerged as a formidable force on the world stage. China is now the largest trading partner for some 120 countries and a significant source of investment capital in the developing world. As its global influence has grown, Beijing has become more assertive in pressing China’s core security interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, where the US and its allies have long held sway. China’s rise poses a threat to Washington’s long-standing dominance of international institutions and norms, as well as the alliance system that has allowed the US to project power around the globe since the end of World War II.
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Friends to all, bound to some: Pacific Island states, security agreements, and the regional order
Author
Powles, Anna
Abstract
Over the past three years, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji have entered into bilateral security and defence agreements with external partners that, in the case of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, implicitly oblige them to provide support to US forces in the event of military conflict in Asia. Elsewhere in the Pacific, the motivations behind such agreements (like the 2024 Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union) are twofold: external partners are seeking to secure support from allies and partners in the Pacific as strategic competition intensifies; and Pacific countries view the agreements, several of which include security assistance, as an opportunity to enhance their national security capabilities. What is less clear, however, is how these agreements align with the foreign policy positions, such as non-alignment and “friends to all,” and national security interests of the Pacific signatories. This article presents preliminary research findings drawn from interviews in Papua New Guinea and Fiji with regional leaders and officials since late 2024. It argues that the growing entrenchment of security agreements is creating a strategic alignment dilemma for Pacific Island states, reshaping regional order from one based on collective neutrality to one of differentiated alignment.
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The (in)security dilemma: Bilateral security agreements in the Pacific Islands region
Authors
McNeill-Stowers, Henrietta
Kant, Romitesh
Abstract
Security in the Pacific Islands region has long been coordinated through a patchwork of multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral arrangements, agreements, and institutions. However, since 2018, there has been an escalation in bilateral security agreements by many external partners to solidify trust within an uncertain geopolitical environment. These agreements are mired in secrecy and political fallout and are no longer limited to traditional security issues. The proliferation of bilateral security arrangements reveals a (re)configuration of what “security” means in the region. The escalation has created a security dilemma, with the opposite effect of what was intended: insecurity. This article examines recent bilateral security agreements between Pacific Island states and external partners (including China, Australia, and the United States) since 2018, and their domestic and regional consequences.
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Losing control? Strategic rivalry, changing US policy, and insecurity in Oceania
Author
Wesley-Smith, Terence
Abstract
Increased geopolitical competition has caused the United States to pay more attention to the Pacific Islands region than at any time since the end of the Cold War. This article explores how Washington’s outreach to the Pacific has developed in recent years, and how President Trump’s approach differs in fundamental ways from that of President Biden. It also outlines some key implications for Pacific states as they pursue their own, increasingly elusive, security interests. I argue that the region as a whole is less secure as a result of increased geopolitical competition, and that the collective ability of Island states to manage its impacts had been significantly eroded—even before Trump resumed office.
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Narrating the Pacific: Think tanks and media in US policy towards Oceania
Author
Szadziewski, Henryk
Abstract
This article examines US discourse on Oceania between 2019 and 2025, focusing on knowledge produced by US think tanks and media. Through a text analysis of 324 publications between 2019 and 2023 and a critical review of selected think-tank policy proposals and media reporting from 2024–2025, the study identifies a dominant narrative that centres US engagement in the region around geostrategic competition with China. The findings show that China, competition, and traditional security are the most frequently occurring themes, marginalizing non-traditional security priorities such as climate change and sustainable livelihoods, issues central to Oceania. The paper critiques how elite narratives reproduce US foreign policy, framing Oceania as a passive space for major power rivalry, rarely contesting competition with China, and ignoring Pacific agency. Pacific Islanders account for only one-fifth of all quoted individuals. The election of President Donald Trump in 2024 and policy proposals such as the Heritage Foundation’s Pacific Pivot indicate a clear shift to an America First approach in Oceania, one that intensifies militarized competition with China while sidelining cooperation on climate and livelihoods. The analysis concludes that US knowledge production reflects a partial understanding of Oceania, legitimizing a China-centric policy at the expense of grounded, locally informed engagement. As political discourse narrows under Trump 2.0, the opportunity for reimagining Pacific futures beyond greatpower competition diminishes. The article contributes to emerging scholarship on grounded approaches to geostrategy in Oceania in the context of major-power rivalry.
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Framing China: How New Zealand’s foreign policy shapes China discourse
Author
Iati, Iati
Abstract
Since the early 2000s, New Zealand–China relations strengthened on the basis of evolving economic linkages, eventuating in China becoming New Zealand’s largest trading partner by 2017. However, from 2018 onwards, New Zealand’s policy framing of China has undergone a dramatic shift, adopting a China-threat narrative that is reflected in consistent adversarial framing through key government documents and statements. Documents such as the 2023– 2028 National Security Strategy (DPMC, 2023) and the 2023 Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment titled “Navigating a shifting world” (MFAT, 2023) construct China as a threat to the rulesbased international order, the security of New Zealand’s region (the Pacific), and core national interests. In examining these and other documents and statements, this article identifies thematic patterns in New Zealand’s post-2018 China narrative. It argues that these frames lack nuance and misrepresent China’s engagement in the Pacific and impact on New Zealand’s international and national interests. Concurrently, they ignore, excuse, and fail to problematise similar behaviour by New Zealand’s Western allies and partners. Ultimately, this reveals a double standard in the construction of New Zealand’s geopolitical outlook, which appears to serve as a pretext for predetermined policy alignments, calling into question New Zealand’s position as an independent foreign policy maker. Ultimately, this paper argues that the mis-framing of China distorts strategic realities, thereby undermining sound policy making, and warns that New Zealand’s geopolitical posture appears increasingly shaped by alliance obligations rather than an independent and objective assessment of its geopolitical environment.
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L’Indo-Pacifique ou Pacifique Bleu? French colonialism and Pacific geopolitics in the age of Trump
Author
Maclellan, Nic
Abstract
From 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron has promoted France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, seeking to advance French and European interests in the region at a time of US-China strategic competition. Despite the rupture caused by the 2021 AUKUS agreement, strategic partners like Australia and New Zealand have backed France’s regional agenda. However, pro-independence leaders in France’s Pacific dependencies are eager to advance the region’s Blue Pacific agenda rather than France’s wider geopolitical interests. The crisis in New Caledonia that erupted on 13 May 2024 highlighted ongoing tensions for French colonial policy in the Pacific islands. This article discusses ways that the French State has sought to advance its Indo-Pacific Strategy and gives examples of tensions with the region’s Blue Pacific agenda. It also looks at the rapidly changing strategic context for France in the Pacific, as the Trump administration launches tariff wars and disrupts historic transatlantic ties with the European Union. As France seeks to maintain its colonial presence in the region, the article outlines six ideological, military, and economic drivers of France’s geopolitical agendas in the Pacific.
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Taiwan’s role as an extension of US and Australian interests in the Pacific
Author
Marinaccio, Jess
Abstract
Given China’s rise in the Pacific, much has been written about its competition with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition in the region. As China and Taiwan have vied for diplomatic partners, China with its superior resources has gained the upper hand. Despite Taiwan’s dwindling official allies, however, its ability before the second Trump administration to build strong relationships with non-allies like the United States raised questions about whether Taiwan really needed official diplomatic ties. Yet, in the Pacific, both Taiwan and the US (and US allies like Australia) have expected that Taiwan should maintain its official relations to help stabilise the region for the West. Beginning with Tuvalu’s decision after its 2024 general elections to continue diplomatic relations with Taiwan despite rumours it might recognise China, this article explores Taiwan’s role until 2025 as an extension of US and Australian interests in the Pacific. I examine how Taiwan’s Pacific aid programs were increasingly linked with US and Australian initiatives to boost Taiwan’s ability to counteract China and maintain diplomatic ties it did not necessarily need. First, I discuss US and Australian reactions to rumours Tuvalu might ally with China after its 2024 elections. Next, I examine intertwined funding initiatives for Tuvalu announced by the US, Australia, and Taiwan before and after Tuvalu’s elections. Finally, I discuss how Tuvaluan politicians leveraged Taiwan’s role as an extension of US and Australian interests and made strategic decisions to maintain ties with Taiwan. I also address the uncertainty of Taiwan’s status in Trump’s second term.
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Indonesia’s “Pacific Elevation” in Oceania’s crisscrossing geopolitical currents
Author
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius
Abstract
This article asserts that while discourses on contemporary geopolitics in Oceania tend to focus predominantly on the United States and China, there are crisscrossing currents of power and relationships beyond the arena of great-power competition. The paper focuses on Indonesia’s relationship with Pacific Island countries. Indonesia is an important member of ASEAN and a middle power in the Indo-Pacific. It is also an archipelagic state that shares similar values, interests, and challenges with Pacific Islands countries. Its Pacific Elevation strategy frames its relationship with the Pacific Islands, facilitating Jakarta’s aim to build alliances in Oceania. However, Indonesia’s reputation in the Pacific is marred by its poor human rights record and its suppression of West Papua’s demands for decolonization. Indonesia has used its increasing influence to tamp down Pacific Island states’ advocacy for West Papua. This could complicate Indonesia’s relationship with Pacific Island countries.
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The Pacific “Ocean of Peace” and the nuclearisation challenge
Author
Fry, Greg
Abstract
The 1986 Treaty of Rarotonga, which prohibits the acquisition, testing, and stationing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific nuclear free zone, has a vital role to play in the “Ocean of Peace” concept currently under development by Pacific Islands Forum leaders. This may not be immediately obvious as none of these activities is currently taking place in the zone. However, the treaty is important in ensuring that this prohibition is not breached in a future context of escalating strategic competition between the nuclear powers. The main danger lies in the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on nuclear-capable ships and planes that rotate through Pacific ports and airfields ostensibly as extended “visits.” Such a possibility is already associated with US basing developments in northern Australia and Micronesia driven by a new US strategy of dispersion and flexibility. While described as rotational visits, they are, in effect, introducing the possibility of permanent deployment of nuclear weapons into the nuclear free zone in the case of Australia (which is a party to the Rarotonga treaty). This suggests the need to put guardrails on military visiting access agreements such as those between the US and Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and between China and Solomon Islands. This will in turn require a collective effort to revitalise the use of the prohibition of the stationing commitment (article 5) of the treaty, to clarify the crucial caveat clause allowing “visits,” and a commitment to use the accountability mechanisms provided in articles 8–10 to ensure compliance.
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Experiment Guam in the age of missile defence
Author
Kuper, Kenneth Gofigan
Abstract
This article argues that Guam serves as a critical testing ground for emerging US military technologies and strategic doctrines, with particular attention to the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (EIAMDS). By examining recent missile defence tests and ongoing military projects, I highlight how Guam’s strategic significance, colonial status, and geographic isolation can exacerbate the island’s vulnerability rather than ensuring its security. Ultimately, I argue that Guam emerges not merely as an isolated military testbed but as a microcosm reflecting broader geopolitical tensions, offering crucial insights into the future trajectory of US-China competition and global security dynamics.
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Old, not new: Why Vanuatu’s vernacular diplomacies matter in Pacific geopolitics
Author
Naupa, Anna
Abstract
This article examines Vanuatu’s diplomatic agency as expressed through culturally grounded protocols and performances, to explore the question: how do vernacular diplomacies reshape the political dynamics with a larger power? It is situated within the “relational turn” of global international relations and extends understanding of diplomatic cultures in international politics through examining the cultural and political structures that make Vanuatu’s diplomacy meaningful. It draws on the concept of Oceanic diplomacy articulated by Sālā George Carter, Greg Fry, and Gordon Nanau (2021) and argues that a focus on vernacular diplomacies allows for a broader appreciation of oceanic and indigenous agency within acts of diplomacy. Through a study of Vanuatu-France high-level engagement in the margins of the 7th Melanesian Arts and Cultural Festival, held in Port Vila, Vanuatu, in July 2023, this article illustrates how vernacular diplomacies can be engaged in Pacific geopolitics. I argue that vernacular diplomacies reshape the political geographies of Pacific-centred diplomacy and offer a deeper understanding of Pacific agency.
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